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The Trust and beneficiaries came into conflict with Natwest in its role as executor and personal representative of the Savile. In particular the Trust – which was named in the will as the residual beneficiary of the estate and would have included intended bequests to charities such as Help for Heroes object to the way the Bank had allowed PI claimants (Slater and Gordon representing) to take precedence over the beneficiaries and the Trust and the exclusion of the Trust in setting up a compensation scheme ‘The scheme’ in consultation with PI claimants, and the third party defendants the BBC, the NHS , Barnardos and Mind.
The scheme was intended to assess claims and negotiate settlements within a set tariff so as to minimise costs, given that the there were limited funds in the estate, and that administration and prior legal hearing had already been significant.
The third parties had an interest in the estate, in that they would wish to recover claims made against them in whole or in part from the estate.
In the event the Trust were excluded from construction of the scheme, and received notice of it having been decided, subject to the ratification of the Court.
One of the central objectives of the scheme was to sift the good claims from the bad, in addition to deciding just how good in the sense meriting higher or lower payments within the tariff they were. To this end a barrister was to be appointed to assess the statement of claim and any medical evidence and other evidence in support or undermining. It was said that this was in the interest of the parties to the scheme, in the sense that unmeritorious claims would deplete funds in respect of meritorious ones.
An application to remove the Bank as executor was refused and the judge approved the scheme subject to one modification – that the Bank and Third party defendants had the express power to consider evidence from the Trust as to the merit of claims where there was information to be given. This was Clause 4:
”Clause 4 did not originally say in terms that the Bank and Third Party Defendants would be entitled to seek to obtain information about claims made under the Scheme from any other person who might have relevant information bearing upon such claims, but Mr Feltham for the PI Claimants assured me that this was properly covered by clause 4 as it stood, since that would be something to be done in making the assessment whether to accept or reject the claims. Since the individual beneficiaries maintained that they had information which might be relevant to assessing whether some claims were bogus or not, and were concerned that the Bank would not have regard to this in assessing such claims under the Scheme, I indicated that it seemed desirable to allay those concerns by making express provision in the Scheme allowing for this to be done.”
But the PI Claimants persisted. They said it was not possible for this scrutiny to take place. It would be unlawful, because so to do would mean the names of claimants would have to be disclosed to the Trust by the Bank, the BBC and others. It would appear so far as the PI claimants were concerned the sifting was strictly an internal affair.
PI Claimants maintained it was contrary to:
‘the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 for the Bank or Third Party Defendants to identify to others a person who was making a claim in relation to sexual abuse.”
The learned judge reflected:
”I was concerned by this, both because no-one had presented any detailed reasoned argument to me to explain why this would be the effect of the 1992 Act (and I was doubtful, absent such argument, that it would be) and because it appeared to make the operation of the Scheme potentially unfair to the Trust and the individual beneficiaries, in that it might well in practice disable the Bank or Third Party Defendants from seeking from them information which could have a material bearing on the question whether a particular claim has merit or not.”
In the light of this key objective within the scheme itself, the parties were obliged to agree that:
“clause 4 of the Scheme should be modified to provide that any claimant wishing to make a claim under the Scheme will have to give consent for their name to be provided to such sources of information (including the individual beneficiaries) as the Bank and the Third Party Defendants might consider helpful to allow for evidence to be obtained to respond to the claim. I am satisfied that this adjustment to the Scheme avoids any problem arising from the 1992 Act in the operation of the Scheme and will allow for the possibility of appropriate access in the course of such operation to relevant information held by the individual beneficiaries and others.”
That the learned judge was puzzled by the reference to the Sexual Offences Amendment Act 1992 is hardly surprising. For this Act covers lifelong anonymity as to the publication of complainants’ names in respect of which criminal proceedings for alleged offences have been instituted.
This of course is singularly lacking in respect of the accused.
Even so it is usual or names of accusers to be disclosed in relation to the defence of civil claims, including the making of enquiries and sharing information and identities for that purpose, and in the sense that the executors are bound to act in the interests of estate and the beneficiaries, not just claimants (but including them in sifting the good from the bad for the sake of the good) it would be obliged to test the evidence in meaningful way which in turn means that naming and necessity are at one.
©Margaret Jervis